Wei Dai: all of me or one of me
1999 Apr 1
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Wei Dai: all of me or one of me @ Satoshi Nakamoto
- Author
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Wei Dai
- Email
-
satoshinakamotonetwork@proton.me
- Site
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https://satoshinakamoto.network
Given the MWI or one of the "everything" theories we've discussed,
the universe must contain multiple observers who have exactly the same
memories and experiences as you do. Should you identify with all of
them, or should you think, "I am one of these people, but I don't know
which"?
I think the following thought experiment shows the latter is more
appropriate. Suppose you are one of two people in a prisoner's dilemma
type game, where if you push button A both players will get 4 dollars,
but if you push button B you will get 5 dollars and the other player
will get nothing. The twist is that both players are given temporary
amnesia and are put into identical rooms so you don't know what your
identity is.
If you identify with both players, then you should press A. However I
think most people under the circumstances will press B. This implies
people must condition their goals (utility functions) on their
identities. That is, they must think like this:
There is equal probability that I am player 1 or player 2. If I am
player 1, then I want to maximize player 1's payoff. If I am player 2,
then I want to maximize player 2's payoff. If I press A, my expected
utility is .5*4 + .5*4 = 4 (plus 4 if the other player
pushes A). If I press B, my expected utility is
.5*5 + .5*5 = 5 (plus 4 if the other player pushes A).
Therefore I should press B.
I don't think it is possible to obtain this result if each player has
only one unconditional utility function defined over states of the
universe. This seems to imply that traditional decision theory is
incomplete.
Discussions: https://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg00563.html
Wei Dai: all of me or one of me
1999 Apr 1 See all postsWei Dai
satoshinakamotonetwork@proton.me
https://satoshinakamoto.network
Given the MWI or one of the "everything" theories we've discussed, the universe must contain multiple observers who have exactly the same memories and experiences as you do. Should you identify with all of them, or should you think, "I am one of these people, but I don't know which"?
I think the following thought experiment shows the latter is more appropriate. Suppose you are one of two people in a prisoner's dilemma type game, where if you push button A both players will get 4 dollars, but if you push button B you will get 5 dollars and the other player will get nothing. The twist is that both players are given temporary amnesia and are put into identical rooms so you don't know what your identity is.
If you identify with both players, then you should press A. However I think most people under the circumstances will press B. This implies people must condition their goals (utility functions) on their identities. That is, they must think like this:
There is equal probability that I am player 1 or player 2. If I am player 1, then I want to maximize player 1's payoff. If I am player 2, then I want to maximize player 2's payoff. If I press A, my expected utility is
.5*4 + .5*4 = 4(plus 4 if the other player pushes A). If I press B, my expected utility is.5*5 + .5*5 = 5(plus 4 if the other player pushes A). Therefore I should press B.I don't think it is possible to obtain this result if each player has only one unconditional utility function defined over states of the universe. This seems to imply that traditional decision theory is incomplete.
Discussions: https://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg00563.html