Mao Zedong: Letter to Lin Biao About Situation Estimate and Action of Red Army(A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire)
1930 Jan 5
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Mao Zedong: Letter to Lin Biao About Situation Estimate and Action of Red Army(A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire) @ Satoshi Nakamoto
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Mao Zedong
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satoshinakamotonetwork@proton.me
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https://satoshinakamoto.network
Comrade Lin Biao：
I have not yet replied to your letter although it is several days
since New Year. One reason is that several things have kept me busy, and
another is that I have been wondering what to write to you. What have I
to offer you that is really good? I have racked my tired brain but found
nothing suitable, which is why I have been putting it off. Now I believe
I have thought of something. I don't know whether it applies exactly to
your situation, but what I have to say is indeed about an important
problem in the present struggle. Even if it does not correspond exactly
with your particular circumstances, it is a vital general problem, and
that is why I am bringing it up.
What is the problem I want to raise? It is how to evaluate the
present situation and what actions of ours must follow from this. I felt
before, and to some extent still feel, that your estimate of the
situation is rather pessimistic. This view of yours was made very clear
at the meeting on the evening of May 18th last year in RuiJin. I know
you believed that the coming of the revolutionary high tide is
inevitable, but you did not believe that it could possibly come quickly.
So, when it came to action, you did not agree with the plan to take
Kiangsi in a single year and only approved of guerrilla fighting in
three districts in Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi border regions. At the same
time you had no profound belief in setting up Red political power in the
three districts, or in deepening and expanding this Red political power
to hasten a nationwide revolutionary high tide. To judge by your belief
in Pend Dehuai-style mobile guerrilla policies, you seem to think that
in a period when the revolutionary high tide is still far off it is a
waste of effort to do the arduous work of establishing political power.
You would prefer using the more convenient mobile guerrilla methods to
extend our political influence, waiting until we have succeeded in
winning over the masses throughout the country, or have gone some way in
that direction, before launching a nationwide insurrection that, with
the strength of the Red Army added to it, will be a great nationwide
revolution.
I do not think that your theory of establishing political power on a
nationwide scale everywhere, having won over the masses first, is
applicable to the Chinese revolution. In my view this theory of yours
arises from a failure to see clearly that China is a semi-colony
competed for by several imperialisms in their final stages. If you
recognized that China is a semi-colony competed for by imperialisms in
their final stages, you would understand first why it is that China
alone in the whole world shows the strange phenomenon of ruling classes
locked in chaotic wars among themselves, why it is that the fighting is
fiercer and more widespread with each passing day, and why there can
never be unified state power. Second, you would appreciate the grave
importance of the peasant question and thus also realize why rural
uprisings have developed on their present national scale. Third, you
would understand the absolute correctness of the slogan of worker
peasant political power. Fourth, you would comprehend why China is the
only country in the world in which the strange phenomenon of ruling
classes locked in complicated wars among themselves has given birth to
another oddity: the existence and growth of a Red Army and guerrilla
units, and, as a consequence, the existence and growth of small areas of
Red political power (soviets) that have appeared in the midst of White
political power. So strange a thing as this is not to be found outside
China. Fifth, you would understand that the Red Army, the guerillas and
the Soviet districts are both the highest form of peasant struggle in a
semi-colony and the form towards which such struggles must move. Sixth,
you would see that these (the Red Army and peasant soviets) are beyond
any doubt the most important force allied to the proletarian struggle in
a semi-colony—the proletariat must step forward to lead it—and that this
is an important factor hastening the coming of the nationwide
revolutionary high tide. Seventh, you would realize that a policy of
fighting purely in a roving guerrilla way cannot fulfill the task of
hastening a nationwide revolutionary high tide. You would also see the
undoubted correctness of the policies of the Chu-Mao, Ho Lung, Li
Wen-lin and Fang Chih-min sort, policies of developing our
political power through wave-like expansion. This involves: the planned
establishment of political power in base areas; the Red Army and the
guerrillas on the one hand and the great mass of the peasantry, on the
other being closely co-ordinated and organized, and being trained
through combat; an intensified agrarian revolution; and the expansion of
the military organization from forces involved in rural uprisings
through district Red Guard battalions, county Red Guard regiments and
local Red Army units to Red Army units that can operate anywhere. This
is the only way in which we can build the confidence of the
revolutionary masses throughout the country, in the way Soviet Russia
has done for the whole world. This is the only way to cause extreme
difficulties for the ruling classes, rock their foundations, and hasten
their internal disintegration. It is also the only way of really
creating a Red Army that will be one of the most important tools in the
great revolution that is to come. It is, in short, the only way of
hastening the revolutionary high tide.
I would like to talk next about what I feel are the reasons for your
rather pessimistic evaluation of the present situation, which I regard
as the exact opposite of the evaluation made by the Party's
revolutionary hot-heads. The comrades who suffer from revolutionary
hot-headedness overestimate subjective forces and
underestimate objective ones. Such evaluations spring largely from an
idealist viewpoint and must result, beyond any doubt, in wanting to take
a mistaken adventurist course. You have not made this mistake; your
shortcomings seem to have been in the other direction—tending to
underestimate subjective forces and overestimate objective ones. This
incorrect evaluation gives rise to bad results of the opposite sort. You
see the weakness of subjective forces and the strength of objective
ones, but do not recognize the following vital points:
1
Although the subjective forces of the Chinese revolution are weak,
all the organizations of the ruling classes (political power, armed
forces, parties, other organizations, etc) which are based on China's
fragile socio-economic organizations, are also weak. This explains why
it is that, although the subjective revolutionary forces of Western
European countries are far stronger than those of China, they are unable
to unleash revolutions at once: their ruling classes are many times
stronger than the Chinese ones. Although the subjective strength of the
Chinese revolution is weak, it is bound to reach a high tide sooner than
Western Europe because the objective forces are also weak.
2
After the defeat of the Great Revolution the subjective revolutionary
forces were indeed enormously weakened. The revolutionary forces that
have survived are so tiny in appearance that they naturally give
pessimistic ideas to the comrades who see things that way; but if one
looks at their real nature they are very different. In the words of an
old Chinese saying, ‘A single spark can start a prairie fire'. This is
to say that, although our forces are tiny at present, they are
developing fast. In the Chinese environment not only can they develop,
they are bound to develop, as was thoroughly proved in the May 30th
Movement and the Great Revolutionary Movement that followed. In looking
at things we must look at their real nature, taking their form only as a
guide to lead us inside. Once inside we must grasp their real nature and
cast aside the form that guided us there. This is the only scientific,
reliable and revolutionary method of analysis.
3
Similarly, in appraising the counter-revolutionary forces, we must
never look merely at their appearance, but should examine their essence.
In the initial period of our independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi
border area, some comrades genuinely believed the incorrect appraisal
made by the Hunan Provincial Committee and regarded the class enemy as
not worth a rap; the two descriptive terms, "terribly shaky" and
"extremely panicky", which are standing jokes to this day, were used by
the Hunan Provincial Committee at the time (from May to June 1928) in
appraising the Hunan ruler Lu Ti-ping.
Such an appraisal necessarily led to putschism in the political sphere.
But during the four months from November of that year to February 1929
(before the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords), when the enemy's third "joint
suppression expedition" was approaching the Chingkang
Mountains, some comrades asked the question, "How long can we keep the
Red Flag flying?" As a matter of fact, the struggle in China between
Britain, the United States and Japan had by then become quite open, and
a state of tangled warfare between Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi clique
and Feng Yu-hsiang was taking shape; hence it was actually the time when
the counter-revolutionary tide had begun to ebb and the revolutionary
tide to rise again. Yet pessimistic ideas were to be found not only in
the Red Army and local Party organizations, even the Central Committee
was misled by appearances and adopted a pessimistic tone. Its February
letter is evidence of the pessimistic analysis made in the Party at that
time.
4
The objective situation today is still such that comrades who see
only the superficial appearance and not the essence of what is before
them are liable to be misled. In particular, when our comrades working
in the Red Army are defeated in battle or encircled or pursued by strong
enemy forces, they often unwittingly generalize and exaggerate their
momentary, specific and limited situation, as though the situation in
China and the world as a whole gave no cause for optimism and the
prospects of victory for the revolution were remote. The reason they
seize on the appearance and brush aside the essence in their observation
of things is that they have not made a scientific analysis of the
essence of the overall situation. The question whether there will soon
be a revolutionary high tide in China can be decided only by making a
detailed examination to ascertain whether the contradictions leading to
a revolutionary high tide are really developing. Since contradictions
are developing in the world between the imperialist countries, between
the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between the
imperialists and the proletariat in their own countries, there is an
intensified need for the imperialists to contend for the domination of
China. While the imperialist contention over China becomes more intense,
both the contradiction between imperialism and the whole Chinese nation
and the contradictions among the imperialists themselves develop
simultaneously on Chinese soil, thereby creating the tangled warfare
which is expanding and intensifying daily and giving rise to the
continuous development of the contradictions among the different cliques
of China's reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradictions among
the reactionary ruling cliques–the tangled warfare among the
warlords–comes heavier taxation, which steadily sharpens the
contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the reactionary
rulers. In the wake of the contradiction between imperialism and China's
national industry comes the failure of the Chinese industrialists to
obtain concessions from the imperialists, which sharpens the
contradiction between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Chinese working
class, with the Chinese capitalists trying to find a way out by
frantically exploiting the workers and with the workers resisting. In
the wake of imperialist commercial aggression, Chinese
merchant-capitalist extortions, heavier government taxation, etc., comes
the deepening of the contradiction between the landlord class and the
peasantry, that is, exploitation through rent and usury is aggravated
and the hatred of the peasants for the landlords grows. Because of the
pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the
worker and peasant masses, and the increase in government taxation, more
and more dealers in Chinese-made goods and independent producers are
being driven into bankruptcy. Because the reactionary government, though
short of provisions and funds, endlessly expands its armies and thus
constantly extends the warfare, the masses of soldiers are in a constant
state of privation. Because of the growth in government taxation, the
rise in rent and interest demanded by the landlords and the daily spread
of the disasters of war, there are famine and banditry everywhere and
the peasant masses and the urban poor can hardly keep alive. Because the
schools have no money, many students fear that their education may be
interrupted; because production is backward, many graduates have no hope
of employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall see
in what a desperate situation, in what a chaotic state, China finds
herself. We shall also see that the high tide of revolution against the
imperialists, the warlords and the landlords is inevitable, and will
come very soon. All China is littered with dry faggots which will soon
be aflame. The saying, "A single spark can start a prairie fire", is an
apt description of how the current situation will develop. We need only
look at the strikes by the workers, the uprisings by the peasants, the
mutinies of soldiers and the strikes of students which are developing in
many places to see that it cannot be long before a "spark" kindles "a
prairie fire".
The gist of the above was already contained in the letter from the
Front Committee to the Central Committee on April 5, 1929, which reads
in part:
The Central Committee's letter [dated February 9, 1929] makes too
pessimistic an appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective
forces. The Kuomintang's three "suppression" campaigns against the
Chingkang Mountains was the high water mark reached by the
counter-revolutionary tide. But there it stopped, and since then the
counter-revolutionary tide has gradually receded while the revolutionary
tide has gradually risen. Although our Party's fighting capacity and
organizational strength have been weakened to the extent described by
the Central Committee, they will be rapidly restored, and the passivity
among comrades in the Party will quickly disappear as the
counter-revolutionary tide gradually ebbs. The masses will certainly
come over to us. The Kuomintang's policy of massacre only serves to
"drive the fish into deep waters", as the saying goes, and
reformism no longer has any mass appeal. It is certain that the masses
will soon shed their illusions about the Kuomintang. In the emerging
situation, no other party will be able to compete with the Communist
Party in winning over the masses. The political line and the
organizational line laid down by the Party's Sixth National Congress are correct, i.e., the revolution at
the present stage is democratic and not socialist, and the present task
of the Party [here the words "in the big cities" should have been added]
is to win over the masses and not to
stage immediate insurrections. Nevertheless the revolution will develop
swiftly, and we should take a positive attitude in our propaganda and
preparations for armed insurrections. In the present chaotic situation
we can lead the masses only by positive slogans and a positive attitude.
Only by taking such an attitude can the Party recover its fighting
capacity.... Proletarian leadership is the sole key to victory in the
revolution. Building a proletarian foundation for the Party and setting
up Party branches in industrial enterprises in key districts are
important organizational tasks for the Party at present; but at the same
time the major prerequisites for helping the struggle in the cities and
hastening the rise of the revolutionary tide are specifically the
development of the struggle in the countryside, the establishment of Red
political power in small areas, and the creation and expansion of the
Red Army. Therefore, it would be wrong to abandon the struggle in the
cities, but in our opinion it would also be wrong for any of our Party
members to fear the growth of peasant strength lest it should outstrip
the workers' strength and harm the revolution. For in the revolution in
semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does
not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never
harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers.
The letter also contained the following reply on the question of the
Red Army's operational tactics:
To preserve the Red Army and arouse the masses, the Central Committee
asks us to divide our forces into very small units and disperse them
over the countryside and to withdraw Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung from the
army, so concealing the major targets. This is an unrealistic view. In
the winter of 1927-28, we did plan to disperse our forces over the
countryside, with each company or battalion operating on its own and
adopting guerrilla tactics in order to arouse the masses while trying
not to present a target for the enemy; we have tried this out many
times, but have failed every time. The reasons are: (1) most of the
soldiers in the main force of the Red Army come from other areas and
have a background different from that of the local Red Guards; (2)
division into small units results in weak leadership and inability to
cope with adverse circumstances, which easily leads to defeat; (3) the
units are liable to be crushed by the enemy one by one; (4) the more
adverse the circumstances, the greater the need for concentrating our
forces and for the leaders to be resolute in struggle, because only thus
can we have internal unity against the enemy. Only in favourable
circumstances is it advisable to divide our forces for guerrilla
operations, and it is only then that the leaders need not stay with the
ranks all the time, as they must in adverse circumstances.
The weakness of this passage is that the reasons adduced against the
division of forces were of a negative character, which was far from
adequate. The positive reason for concentrating our forces is that only
concentration will enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units
and occupy towns. Only after we have wiped out comparatively large enemy
units and occupied towns can we arouse the masses on a broad scale and
set up political power extending over a number of adjoining counties.
Only thus can we make a widespread impact (what we call "extending our
political influence"), and contribute effectively to speeding the day of
the revolutionary high tide. For instance, both the regime we set up in
the Hunan-Kiangsi border area the year before last and the one we set up
in western Fukien last year were the product of this
policy of concentrating our troops. This is a general principle. But are
there not times when our forces should be divided up? Yes, there are.
The letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee says of
guerrilla tactics for the Red Army, including the division of forces
within a short radius:
The tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years
are indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese
or foreign. With our tactics, the masses can be aroused for struggle on
an ever-broadening scale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with
us. Ours are guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following
points:
"Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to
deal with the enemy."
"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy
tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."
"To extend stable base areas, employ the policy of
advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy
of circling around."
"Arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time
and by the best possible methods."
These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be
able to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses
and draw it in to deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have used
for the past three years.
Here, "to cast the net wide" means to divide our forces within a
short radius. For example, when we first captured the county town of
Yunghsin in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, we divided the forces of the
29th and 31st Regiments within the boundaries of Yunghsin County. Again,
when we captured Yunghsin for the third time, we once more divided our
forces by dispatching the 28th Regiment to the border of Anfu County,
the 29th to Lienhua, and the 31st to the border of Kian County. And,
again, we divided our forces in the counties of southern Kiangsi last
April and May, and in the counties of western Fukien last July. As to
dividing our forces over a wide radius, it is possible only on the two
conditions that circumstances are comparatively favourable and the
leading bodies fairly strong. For the purpose of dividing up our forces
is to put us in a better position for winning over the masses, for
deepening the agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and
for expanding the Red Army and the local armed units. It is better not
to divide our forces when this purpose cannot be attained or the
division of our forces would lead to defeat and to the weakening of the
Red Army, as happened in August two years ago when our forces were
divided on the Hunan-Kiangsi border for an attack on Chenchou. But there
is no doubt that, given the two above-mentioned conditions, we should
divide our forces, because division is then more advantageous than
concentration. As for the division of troops in order to preserve
strength and avoid concentration of targets under serious circumstances,
I am opposed to this point in principle, as stated in the letter from
the former committee to the Central Committee quoted above. In addition,
will there be a time in the future when we should divide our troops to
work because the economic situation does not allow concentration? There
might be, but I can't say for sure, because we don't have concrete
experience of this kind of situation.
The Central Committee's February letter was not in the right spirit
and had a bad effect on a number of Party comrades in the Fourth Army.
At that time the Central Committee also issued a circular stating that
war would not necessarily break out between Chiang Kai-shek and the
Kwangsi warlords. Since then, however, the appraisals and directives of
the Central Committee have in the main been correct. It has already
issued another circular correcting the one containing the wrong
appraisal. Although it has not made any correction of the letter to the
Red Army, its subsequent directives have not been couched in the same
pessimistic tone and its views on the Red Army's operations now coincide
with ours. Yet the bad effect which this letter had on some comrades
persists. Therefore, I feel that it is still necessary to give some
explanation.
The plan to take Kiangsi Province within a year was also proposed
last April by the Front Committee to the Central Committee, and a
decision to that effect was later made at Yutu. The following reasons
were given in the letter to the Central Committee:
The armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords areapproaching
each other in the vicinity of Kiukiang, and a big battle is imminent.
The resumption of mass struggle, coupled with the spread of
contradictions among the ruling reactionaries, makes it probable that
there will soon be a high tide of revolution. As for how our work should
be arranged under these circumstances, we feel that, so far as the
southern provinces are concerned, the armed forces of the compradors and
landlords in Kwangtung and Hunan Provinces are too strong, and that in
Hunan, more over, we have lost almost all our mass following, inside as
well as outside the Party, because of the Party's putschist mistakes. In
the three provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi and Chekiang, however, the
situation is different. First, militarily the enemy is weakest there. In
Chekiang, there is only a small provincial force under Chiang Po-cheng.
In Fukien, although there are five
groups of enemy troops totalling fourteen regiments in all, Kuo
Fengming's troops have already been smashed; the troops under Chen
Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang are bandits of small
fighting capacity; the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast
have never seen action and their fighting capacity is undoubtedly not
high; Chang Chen alone can put up some sort of a
fight, but, according to an analysis made by the Fukien Provincial
Committee, even he has only two relatively strong regiments. In
addition, Fukien is now in a state of complete chaos, confusion and
disunity. In Kiangsi, there are sixteen regiments under the two commands
of Chu Pei-teh and Hsiung Shih-hui; they are stronger than the armed
forces of either Fukien or Chekiang, but far inferior to those of Hunan.
Secondly, fewer putschist mistakes have been made in these three
provinces. We are not clear about the situation in Chekiang, but the
Party's organizational and mass base is somewhat better in Kiangsi and
Fukien than in Hunan. Take Kiangsi for example. In northern Kiangsi we
still have some basis in Tehan, Hsiushui and Tungku; in western Kiangsi
the Party and the Red Guards still have some strength in Ningkang,
Yunghsin, Lienhua and Suichuan; in southern Kiangsi the prospects are
still brighter, as the 2nd and 4th Regiments of` the Red Army are
steadily growing in strength in the counties of Kian, Yungfeng and
Hsingkuo; and what is more, the Red Army under Fang Chih-min has by no
means been wiped out. All this places us in a position to close in on
Nanchang. We hereby recommend to the Central Committee that during the
period of prolonged warfare among the Kuomintang warlords, we should
contend with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi clique for Kiangsi Province
and also for western Fukien and western Chekiang. In these three
provinces we should enlarge the Red Army and create an independent
regime of the masses, with a time limit of one year for accomplishing
this plan. During this year, we must establish a proletarian struggle
foundation in Shanghai, Wuxi, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, etc., so
that we can lead the struggle of the peasants in the three provinces of
Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Fujian. The Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee
must be sound, and the staff base in Nanchang, Jiujiang, Ji'an and
NanXunLu must be established diligently.
This proposal to contend for Kiangsi erred only in setting a time
limit of one year. It was based not only on conditions within the
province itself, but also on the prospect that a nation-wide high tide
of revolution would soon arise. For unless we had been convinced that
there would soon be a high tide of revolution, we could not possibly
have concluded that we could take Kiangsi in a year. The only weakness
in the proposal was that it set a time limit of one year, which it
should not have done, and so gave a flavour of impetuosity to the word
"soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a high tide of revolution".
As to the subjective and objective conditions in Kiangsi, they well
deserve our attention. Besides the subjective conditions described in
the letter to the Central Committee, three objective conditions can now
be clearly pointed out. First, the economy of Kiangsi is mainly feudal,
the merchant-capitalist class is relatively weak, and the armed forces
of the landlords are weaker than in any other southern province.
Secondly, Kiangsi has no provincial troops of its own and has always
been garrisoned by troops from other provinces. Sent there for the
"suppression of Communists" or "suppression of bandits", these troops
are unfamiliar with local conditions, their interests are much less
directly involved than if they were local troops, and they usually lack
enthusiasm. And thirdly, unlike Kwangtung which is close to Hongkong and
under British control in almost every respect, Kiangsi is comparatively
remote from imperialist influence. Once we have grasped these three
points, we can understand why rural uprisings are more widespread and
the Red Army and guerrilla units more numerous in Kiangsi than in any
other province.
I have roughly finished what I have to say to you. It's too much to
talk about. But I think our discussion is beneficial. If the problem we
discuss here is solved correctly, and it will definitely affect the
actions of the Red Army greatly. Therefore, I am very happy to write
this article.
Finally, there are two more points to make. First, how then should we
interpret the word "soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a high
tide of revolution"? This is a common question among comrades. Marxists
are not fortune-tellers. They should, and indeed can, only indicate the
general direction of future developments and changes; they should not
and cannot fix the day and the hour in a mechanistic way. But when I say
that there will soon be a high tide of revolution in China, I am
emphatically not speaking of something which in the words of some people
"is possibly coming", something illusory, unattainable and devoid of
significance for action. It is like a ship far out at sea whose
mast-head can already be seen from the shore; it is like the morning sun
in the east whose shimmering rays are visible from a high mountain top;
it is like a child about to be born moving restlessly in its mother's
womb. Second, when I said that you want to expand your political
influence by means of mobile guerrilla warfare, I did not mean that you
have a purely military viewpoint or rogue thinking. You obviously don't
have these two, because the two have absolutely no concept of winning
over the masses, while you advocate "letting go to win over the masses."
Not only do you advocate, but you actually do it. What I don't agree
with you is that you lack a profound concept of establishing a political
power, so the task of winning over the masses and promoting the
revolutionary upsurge must not be achieved as satisfactorily as you
think in your heart. This is the main purpose of my letter.
Please correct me if I am wrong.
Mao Zedong at Gutian, Shanghang
Notes
Mao Zedong: Letter to Lin Biao About Situation Estimate and Action of Red Army(A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire)
1930 Jan 5 See all postsMao Zedong
satoshinakamotonetwork@proton.me
https://satoshinakamoto.network
Comrade Lin Biao：
I have not yet replied to your letter although it is several days since New Year. One reason is that several things have kept me busy, and another is that I have been wondering what to write to you. What have I to offer you that is really good? I have racked my tired brain but found nothing suitable, which is why I have been putting it off. Now I believe I have thought of something. I don't know whether it applies exactly to your situation, but what I have to say is indeed about an important problem in the present struggle. Even if it does not correspond exactly with your particular circumstances, it is a vital general problem, and that is why I am bringing it up.
What is the problem I want to raise? It is how to evaluate the present situation and what actions of ours must follow from this. I felt before, and to some extent still feel, that your estimate of the situation is rather pessimistic. This view of yours was made very clear at the meeting on the evening of May 18th last year in RuiJin. I know you believed that the coming of the revolutionary high tide is inevitable, but you did not believe that it could possibly come quickly. So, when it came to action, you did not agree with the plan to take Kiangsi in a single year and only approved of guerrilla fighting in three districts in Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi border regions. At the same time you had no profound belief in setting up Red political power in the three districts, or in deepening and expanding this Red political power to hasten a nationwide revolutionary high tide. To judge by your belief in Pend Dehuai-style mobile guerrilla policies, you seem to think that in a period when the revolutionary high tide is still far off it is a waste of effort to do the arduous work of establishing political power. You would prefer using the more convenient mobile guerrilla methods to extend our political influence, waiting until we have succeeded in winning over the masses throughout the country, or have gone some way in that direction, before launching a nationwide insurrection that, with the strength of the Red Army added to it, will be a great nationwide revolution.
I do not think that your theory of establishing political power on a nationwide scale everywhere, having won over the masses first, is applicable to the Chinese revolution. In my view this theory of yours arises from a failure to see clearly that China is a semi-colony competed for by several imperialisms in their final stages. If you recognized that China is a semi-colony competed for by imperialisms in their final stages, you would understand first why it is that China alone in the whole world shows the strange phenomenon of ruling classes locked in chaotic wars among themselves, why it is that the fighting is fiercer and more widespread with each passing day, and why there can never be unified state power. Second, you would appreciate the grave importance of the peasant question and thus also realize why rural uprisings have developed on their present national scale. Third, you would understand the absolute correctness of the slogan of worker peasant political power. Fourth, you would comprehend why China is the only country in the world in which the strange phenomenon of ruling classes locked in complicated wars among themselves has given birth to another oddity: the existence and growth of a Red Army and guerrilla units, and, as a consequence, the existence and growth of small areas of Red political power (soviets) that have appeared in the midst of White political power. So strange a thing as this is not to be found outside China. Fifth, you would understand that the Red Army, the guerillas and the Soviet districts are both the highest form of peasant struggle in a semi-colony and the form towards which such struggles must move. Sixth, you would see that these (the Red Army and peasant soviets) are beyond any doubt the most important force allied to the proletarian struggle in a semi-colony—the proletariat must step forward to lead it—and that this is an important factor hastening the coming of the nationwide revolutionary high tide. Seventh, you would realize that a policy of fighting purely in a roving guerrilla way cannot fulfill the task of hastening a nationwide revolutionary high tide. You would also see the undoubted correctness of the policies of the Chu-Mao, Ho Lung, Li Wen-lin and Fang Chih-min1 sort, policies of developing our political power through wave-like expansion. This involves: the planned establishment of political power in base areas; the Red Army and the guerrillas on the one hand and the great mass of the peasantry, on the other being closely co-ordinated and organized, and being trained through combat; an intensified agrarian revolution; and the expansion of the military organization from forces involved in rural uprisings through district Red Guard battalions, county Red Guard regiments and local Red Army units to Red Army units that can operate anywhere. This is the only way in which we can build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, in the way Soviet Russia has done for the whole world. This is the only way to cause extreme difficulties for the ruling classes, rock their foundations, and hasten their internal disintegration. It is also the only way of really creating a Red Army that will be one of the most important tools in the great revolution that is to come. It is, in short, the only way of hastening the revolutionary high tide.
I would like to talk next about what I feel are the reasons for your rather pessimistic evaluation of the present situation, which I regard as the exact opposite of the evaluation made by the Party's revolutionary hot-heads. The comrades who suffer from revolutionary hot-headedness overestimate subjective forces2 and underestimate objective ones. Such evaluations spring largely from an idealist viewpoint and must result, beyond any doubt, in wanting to take a mistaken adventurist course. You have not made this mistake; your shortcomings seem to have been in the other direction—tending to underestimate subjective forces and overestimate objective ones. This incorrect evaluation gives rise to bad results of the opposite sort. You see the weakness of subjective forces and the strength of objective ones, but do not recognize the following vital points:
1
Although the subjective forces of the Chinese revolution are weak, all the organizations of the ruling classes (political power, armed forces, parties, other organizations, etc) which are based on China's fragile socio-economic organizations, are also weak. This explains why it is that, although the subjective revolutionary forces of Western European countries are far stronger than those of China, they are unable to unleash revolutions at once: their ruling classes are many times stronger than the Chinese ones. Although the subjective strength of the Chinese revolution is weak, it is bound to reach a high tide sooner than Western Europe because the objective forces are also weak.
2
After the defeat of the Great Revolution the subjective revolutionary forces were indeed enormously weakened. The revolutionary forces that have survived are so tiny in appearance that they naturally give pessimistic ideas to the comrades who see things that way; but if one looks at their real nature they are very different. In the words of an old Chinese saying, ‘A single spark can start a prairie fire'. This is to say that, although our forces are tiny at present, they are developing fast. In the Chinese environment not only can they develop, they are bound to develop, as was thoroughly proved in the May 30th Movement and the Great Revolutionary Movement that followed. In looking at things we must look at their real nature, taking their form only as a guide to lead us inside. Once inside we must grasp their real nature and cast aside the form that guided us there. This is the only scientific, reliable and revolutionary method of analysis.
3
Similarly, in appraising the counter-revolutionary forces, we must never look merely at their appearance, but should examine their essence. In the initial period of our independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, some comrades genuinely believed the incorrect appraisal made by the Hunan Provincial Committee and regarded the class enemy as not worth a rap; the two descriptive terms, "terribly shaky" and "extremely panicky", which are standing jokes to this day, were used by the Hunan Provincial Committee at the time (from May to June 1928) in appraising the Hunan ruler Lu Ti-ping. 3 Such an appraisal necessarily led to putschism in the political sphere. But during the four months from November of that year to February 1929 (before the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords),4 when the enemy's third "joint suppression expedition" 5 was approaching the Chingkang Mountains, some comrades asked the question, "How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?" As a matter of fact, the struggle in China between Britain, the United States and Japan had by then become quite open, and a state of tangled warfare between Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi clique and Feng Yu-hsiang was taking shape; hence it was actually the time when the counter-revolutionary tide had begun to ebb and the revolutionary tide to rise again. Yet pessimistic ideas were to be found not only in the Red Army and local Party organizations, even the Central Committee was misled by appearances and adopted a pessimistic tone. Its February letter is evidence of the pessimistic analysis made in the Party at that time.
4
The objective situation today is still such that comrades who see only the superficial appearance and not the essence of what is before them are liable to be misled. In particular, when our comrades working in the Red Army are defeated in battle or encircled or pursued by strong enemy forces, they often unwittingly generalize and exaggerate their momentary, specific and limited situation, as though the situation in China and the world as a whole gave no cause for optimism and the prospects of victory for the revolution were remote. The reason they seize on the appearance and brush aside the essence in their observation of things is that they have not made a scientific analysis of the essence of the overall situation. The question whether there will soon be a revolutionary high tide in China can be decided only by making a detailed examination to ascertain whether the contradictions leading to a revolutionary high tide are really developing. Since contradictions are developing in the world between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between the imperialists and the proletariat in their own countries, there is an intensified need for the imperialists to contend for the domination of China. While the imperialist contention over China becomes more intense, both the contradiction between imperialism and the whole Chinese nation and the contradictions among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously on Chinese soil, thereby creating the tangled warfare which is expanding and intensifying daily and giving rise to the continuous development of the contradictions among the different cliques of China's reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradictions among the reactionary ruling cliques–the tangled warfare among the warlords–comes heavier taxation, which steadily sharpens the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradiction between imperialism and China's national industry comes the failure of the Chinese industrialists to obtain concessions from the imperialists, which sharpens the contradiction between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class, with the Chinese capitalists trying to find a way out by frantically exploiting the workers and with the workers resisting. In the wake of imperialist commercial aggression, Chinese merchant-capitalist extortions, heavier government taxation, etc., comes the deepening of the contradiction between the landlord class and the peasantry, that is, exploitation through rent and usury is aggravated and the hatred of the peasants for the landlords grows. Because of the pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the worker and peasant masses, and the increase in government taxation, more and more dealers in Chinese-made goods and independent producers are being driven into bankruptcy. Because the reactionary government, though short of provisions and funds, endlessly expands its armies and thus constantly extends the warfare, the masses of soldiers are in a constant state of privation. Because of the growth in government taxation, the rise in rent and interest demanded by the landlords and the daily spread of the disasters of war, there are famine and banditry everywhere and the peasant masses and the urban poor can hardly keep alive. Because the schools have no money, many students fear that their education may be interrupted; because production is backward, many graduates have no hope of employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall see in what a desperate situation, in what a chaotic state, China finds herself. We shall also see that the high tide of revolution against the imperialists, the warlords and the landlords is inevitable, and will come very soon. All China is littered with dry faggots which will soon be aflame. The saying, "A single spark can start a prairie fire", is an apt description of how the current situation will develop. We need only look at the strikes by the workers, the uprisings by the peasants, the mutinies of soldiers and the strikes of students which are developing in many places to see that it cannot be long before a "spark" kindles "a prairie fire".
The gist of the above was already contained in the letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee on April 5, 1929, which reads in part:
The letter also contained the following reply on the question of the Red Army's operational tactics:
The weakness of this passage is that the reasons adduced against the division of forces were of a negative character, which was far from adequate. The positive reason for concentrating our forces is that only concentration will enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy towns. Only after we have wiped out comparatively large enemy units and occupied towns can we arouse the masses on a broad scale and set up political power extending over a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we make a widespread impact (what we call "extending our political influence"), and contribute effectively to speeding the day of the revolutionary high tide. For instance, both the regime we set up in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area the year before last and the one we set up in western Fukien last year 9 were the product of this policy of concentrating our troops. This is a general principle. But are there not times when our forces should be divided up? Yes, there are. The letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee says of guerrilla tactics for the Red Army, including the division of forces within a short radius:
Here, "to cast the net wide" means to divide our forces within a short radius. For example, when we first captured the county town of Yunghsin in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, we divided the forces of the 29th and 31st Regiments within the boundaries of Yunghsin County. Again, when we captured Yunghsin for the third time, we once more divided our forces by dispatching the 28th Regiment to the border of Anfu County, the 29th to Lienhua, and the 31st to the border of Kian County. And, again, we divided our forces in the counties of southern Kiangsi last April and May, and in the counties of western Fukien last July. As to dividing our forces over a wide radius, it is possible only on the two conditions that circumstances are comparatively favourable and the leading bodies fairly strong. For the purpose of dividing up our forces is to put us in a better position for winning over the masses, for deepening the agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and for expanding the Red Army and the local armed units. It is better not to divide our forces when this purpose cannot be attained or the division of our forces would lead to defeat and to the weakening of the Red Army, as happened in August two years ago when our forces were divided on the Hunan-Kiangsi border for an attack on Chenchou. But there is no doubt that, given the two above-mentioned conditions, we should divide our forces, because division is then more advantageous than concentration. As for the division of troops in order to preserve strength and avoid concentration of targets under serious circumstances, I am opposed to this point in principle, as stated in the letter from the former committee to the Central Committee quoted above. In addition, will there be a time in the future when we should divide our troops to work because the economic situation does not allow concentration? There might be, but I can't say for sure, because we don't have concrete experience of this kind of situation.
The Central Committee's February letter was not in the right spirit and had a bad effect on a number of Party comrades in the Fourth Army. At that time the Central Committee also issued a circular stating that war would not necessarily break out between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords. Since then, however, the appraisals and directives of the Central Committee have in the main been correct. It has already issued another circular correcting the one containing the wrong appraisal. Although it has not made any correction of the letter to the Red Army, its subsequent directives have not been couched in the same pessimistic tone and its views on the Red Army's operations now coincide with ours. Yet the bad effect which this letter had on some comrades persists. Therefore, I feel that it is still necessary to give some explanation.
The plan to take Kiangsi Province within a year was also proposed last April by the Front Committee to the Central Committee, and a decision to that effect was later made at Yutu. The following reasons were given in the letter to the Central Committee:
This proposal to contend for Kiangsi erred only in setting a time limit of one year. It was based not only on conditions within the province itself, but also on the prospect that a nation-wide high tide of revolution would soon arise. For unless we had been convinced that there would soon be a high tide of revolution, we could not possibly have concluded that we could take Kiangsi in a year. The only weakness in the proposal was that it set a time limit of one year, which it should not have done, and so gave a flavour of impetuosity to the word "soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a high tide of revolution". As to the subjective and objective conditions in Kiangsi, they well deserve our attention. Besides the subjective conditions described in the letter to the Central Committee, three objective conditions can now be clearly pointed out. First, the economy of Kiangsi is mainly feudal, the merchant-capitalist class is relatively weak, and the armed forces of the landlords are weaker than in any other southern province. Secondly, Kiangsi has no provincial troops of its own and has always been garrisoned by troops from other provinces. Sent there for the "suppression of Communists" or "suppression of bandits", these troops are unfamiliar with local conditions, their interests are much less directly involved than if they were local troops, and they usually lack enthusiasm. And thirdly, unlike Kwangtung which is close to Hongkong and under British control in almost every respect, Kiangsi is comparatively remote from imperialist influence. Once we have grasped these three points, we can understand why rural uprisings are more widespread and the Red Army and guerrilla units more numerous in Kiangsi than in any other province.
I have roughly finished what I have to say to you. It's too much to talk about. But I think our discussion is beneficial. If the problem we discuss here is solved correctly, and it will definitely affect the actions of the Red Army greatly. Therefore, I am very happy to write this article.
Finally, there are two more points to make. First, how then should we interpret the word "soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a high tide of revolution"? This is a common question among comrades. Marxists are not fortune-tellers. They should, and indeed can, only indicate the general direction of future developments and changes; they should not and cannot fix the day and the hour in a mechanistic way. But when I say that there will soon be a high tide of revolution in China, I am emphatically not speaking of something which in the words of some people "is possibly coming", something illusory, unattainable and devoid of significance for action. It is like a ship far out at sea whose mast-head can already be seen from the shore; it is like the morning sun in the east whose shimmering rays are visible from a high mountain top; it is like a child about to be born moving restlessly in its mother's womb. Second, when I said that you want to expand your political influence by means of mobile guerrilla warfare, I did not mean that you have a purely military viewpoint or rogue thinking. You obviously don't have these two, because the two have absolutely no concept of winning over the masses, while you advocate "letting go to win over the masses." Not only do you advocate, but you actually do it. What I don't agree with you is that you lack a profound concept of establishing a political power, so the task of winning over the masses and promoting the revolutionary upsurge must not be achieved as satisfactorily as you think in your heart. This is the main purpose of my letter.
Please correct me if I am wrong.
Mao Zedong at Gutian, Shanghang
Notes
Comrade Fang Chih-min, a native of Yiyang, Kiangsi Province, and a member of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was the founder of the Red area in northeastern Kiangsi and of the Tenth Red Army. In 1934 he led the vanguard detachment of the Red Army in marching north to resist the Japanese invaders. In January 1935 he was captured in battle against the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang troops and in July he died a martyr's death in Nanchang, Kiangsi.↩︎
The subjective forces of the revolution mean the organized forces of the revolution.↩︎
Lu Ti-ping, a Kuomintang warlord, was the Kuomintang governor of Hunan Province in 1928.↩︎
The war of March-April 1929 between Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang warlord in Nanking, and Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, the Kuomintang warlords in Kwangsi Province.↩︎
The third invasion of the Red Army's base area on the Chingkang Mountains by the Kuomintang warlords in Hunan and Kiangsi lasting from the cad of 1928 to the beginning of 1929.↩︎
The quotation is from Mencius, who compared a tyrant who drove his people into seeking a benevolent ruler to the otter which "drives the fish into deep waters".↩︎
The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in July 1928. It pointed out that after the defeat in 1927, China's revolution remained bourgeois-democratic in nature, i.e., anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, and that since the inevitable new high tide in the revolution was not yet imminent, the general line for the revolution should be to win over the masses. The Sixth Congress liquidated the 1927 Right capitulationism of Chen Tu-hsiu and also repudiated the "Left" putschism which occurred in the Party at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928.↩︎
The statement in brackets has been added by the author.↩︎
The regime set up in western Fukien came into bang in 1929, when the Red Army in the Chingkang Mountains sallied eastward to build a new revolutionary base area and established the people's revolutionary political power in the counties of Lungyen, Yungting and Shanghang in the western part of that province.↩︎
Stable base areas were the relatively stable revolutionary base areas established by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.↩︎
Chiang Po-cheng was then the commander of the Kuomintang peace preservation corps in Chekiang Province.↩︎
Chen Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang were two notorious Fukien bandits whose forces had been incorporated into the Kuomintang army.↩︎
Chang Chen was a divisional commander of the Kuomintang army.↩︎
Chu Pei-the, a Kuomintang warlord, was then the Kuomintang governor of Kiangsi Province.↩︎
Hsiung Shih-hui was then a divisional commander of the Kuomintang army in Kiangsi Province.↩︎